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PREFACE
After I had been a field grade officer in the United States Army Reserve (USAR) long enough to get over the shock of arriving at "career status" sometime in the mid to late 1990s, I became even more interested in the dynamics of the population I was part of. I had been schooled over the years on the considerations for career success and I began studying in an attempt to divine my future prospects. I read all the professional material I could get my hands on and I engaged others in discussion at every chance.
What began to emerge was a current picture, which did not jive with what I was taught when I was younger. The more I spoke to leaders, peers, and junior officers, the more apparent that things were no longer the same as I had been trained to expect earlier in my career.
I had been active in the Reserve Officers Association for several years and had done some work on a committee, which addressed Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) and Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) issues. I eventually became the committee chairperson. In that capacity, I began to request information on reserve officer population numbers. This led to meeting Majors (both now Lieutenant Colonels) Francisco Espaillat and Joseph Whitlock, who were Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) officers working at the Army Reserve Personnel Command in St. Louis, MO (now Human Resources Command -St. Louis).
Francisco provided a superb briefing on the fundamentals of reserve career management at the Reserve Officers Association Mid-Winter Conference in January 2000. He also gave a detailed outline of the reserve officer population. It was the first time I had ever seen numbers to confirm what I was seeing when I inspected USAR units and spoke with other Army reserve component officers. Recently there has been a spate of articles published on the "sudden" discovery of a shortage of personnel, including officers, in the reserve components of the Army. I can attest that Espaillat and Whitlock accurately detected the growing officer shortage not later than 1997. This paper builds upon their work and follows what was "only" a company grade shortage that has now, predictably, entered the field grades, encompassing what I call the "mid-grades". viii ix
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Thank you all. Reserve was "rapidly degenerating in to a "broken" force." 1 Many of those who serve in the Army Reserve had been concerned for some time about the health of the force and its ability to meet the requirements of multiple waves of continued mobilization. Several news articles and editorials questioning how much use the reserve components could withstand were published in the months leading up to the Helmly memo's publication. This paper examines issues which brought us to where we are today, why we can expect a continued downward trend in reserve officer strengths, and some options for improving critical reserve officer inventories. Personnel shortages exist across the force today, but this paper focuses on the shortage of experienced mid-grade officers who require lengthy training to replace. It is time to take action to retain the officers we have and to produce more officers by all possible means. The ability of the United
MID-GRADE ARMY RESERVE OFFICERS -IN SHORT SUPPLY OF A CRITICAL COMPONENT OF A STRATEGIC MEANS
States to project military power over an extended period and in sufficient numbers to meet policy objectives demands it.
THE CITIZEN SOLDIER AND TODAY
American history has examples of citizen soldiers from the earliest European settling of the continent. As such, the citizen soldier concept is an enduring belief that helps lead to a developed U.S. National Security Strategy. 2 It is also the law of the land as embedded in the United States Constitution militia clauses and it is current military policy, notably back to the Laird Total Force Concept/ Schlesinger Total Force Policy/ Abrams Doctrine of the 1970s. In the wake of the Vietnam War, the Army realigned its structure so that the Active Component could not conduct sustained operations without reserve component augmentation. 3 The American military is an element of national power and it is certainly a tool for the exercise of U.S. National Security Policy. 4 The Army and its reserve components are a means of conducting national strategy. 5 There is also little debate that the United States is currently the preeminent military power in the world, but it cannot conduct large scale, sustained operations without its reserve components. The United States' military must remain a robust and fully manned force, capable of conducting operations across a broad continuum and more than likely at multiple locations.
None of this argues for a smaller total force.
Every chain is only as strong as its weakest link. Today, one of the links in the U.S.
military that is under a great deal of stress is the Army's reserve officer corps. Without an experienced core of mid-grade officers, a military organization would grind to a painful halt.
(The same can be said relative to the enlisted mid-grades within their realm of work.)
By sheer weight of numbers and the nature of ground combat, the Army has been the most heavily engaged in post 9/11 operations. Unfortunately, the Army drew down its personnel strength and structure, both active and reserve, significantly after the fall of the Soviet Union and the first Gulf War in 1991. The United States has a tradition of rapid demobilization followed by traumatic mobilization between major combat actions. In the end, the soldier suffers as well as the civilians in the combat zone who inevitably must endure longer periods of privation and danger because the warfare takes longer to conclude. General Creighton Abrams, Army Chief of Staff 1972 -1974, said"…I am appalled at the human cost that we've paid because we would not prepare to fight". 6 A good argument can even be made that excessive de-mobilization creates a perception of weakness which adversaries believe they can exploit and that the cost of ensuing conflict exceeds by several orders of magnitude the savings of excessive demobilization. 7 Today, warfare is so expensive, both to conduct and to repair the effects of, that we literally cannot afford to be caught unprepared. Additionally, the cost of keeping an active force prepared in periods of peace is so expensive that a significant reserve force must augment the depth and strength in that total force if it is to be truly robust. Furthermore, any review of recent political discourse will show the competition for distribution of wealth and resources in a democracy such as the United States is enormous.
Active Duty U.S. Army Strength
On November 17 th 2004, Lieutenant General James R. Helmly, the Chief, Army Reserve and the senior Army Reserve officer of the Army testified before the House Armed Services
Committee that the Army Reserve is short of officers and that someone was "asleep at the switch". He expects it to take "five to seven years before we can correct the imbalance".
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IN THE BEGINNING
To examine the shortage of reserve officers, one must begin at the front end of the shortage, and that is with the numbers of officers created through the various means used by the Army and the capacity of those programs to adjust to needs.
The Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) is a college-based program, which provides the Army with a majority of its officers, both active, and reserve. 9 The program generally lasts four years, but two-year versions exist. That is "the first time since 1989". 11 It should be noted however that this in no way means the Army's reserve components are currently getting enough lieutenants to begin to overcome the shortages created by nearly a decade and a half of inadequate input. more importantly, were so critical that they induced a failure to continue participation in the reserve components after leaving active duty. 15 Lewis also notes that the Army's reaction to its active component company grade officer shortage in the late 1990s was to promote lieutenants faster and to increase lieutenant production. 16 As the Army ROTC Officer Production chart and ROTC graduates than to suffer the consequences of definitive under-production. Unfortunately, until world events play out several years down the road, it is very difficult to tell what the "correct" minimum level of ROTC production is. It would be fair to say though, that the correct level of reserve officer production is one that does not lead to shortages.
The GAO report refers to Officer Candidate School (OCS) being able to adjust production in order to cushion against decreased (or presumably increased) demand for lieutenants. 20 However, the paradigm for OCS has been affected by the absence of a draft that once brought more college graduates and others with the minimum requirements for entering OCS, into the service. The Army currently has only one active duty site for OCS and that is Fort Benning, GA.
It teaches 10 regular classes a year of up to 160 students, and according to the OCS web site, since 1998, they have also done the final phase of OCS for all State National Guard OCS programs with about 650 reserve component graduates a year. The nature and demands of fighting asymmetrical warfare under partial mobilization authority has made the reserve components a victim of their own successful integration with the active force. Some active duty veterans used to say they did not want to serve in the reserves because they had poor perceptions of standards in the reserve force. Today, it is the opposite.
USAR Selected Reserve as of 30 Sept
Today, many former Soldiers say, that if they wanted to be "active", they would have stayed active.
Majors who are twice non-selected for Lieutenant Colonel may be removed from service when they reach twenty years of commissioned service. 31 For Lieutenant Colonels and Colonels, Mandatory Removal Date, or MRD, is another factor controlling outflow of officers.
The MRD for Lieutenant Colonels is at 28 years of commissioned service. For Colonels, the were discharged primarily as a result of non-participation, as opposed to poor/mediocre performance, and that subject to the needs of the services, those officers be invited to apply to be reappointed." 35 It is unlikely that that a high percentage of former officers who passed through the reserve promotions process and were discharged prior to 1997 would be viable or have interest in returning to service. The number of officers discharged since 1997 is roughly on the order of 16,000. 36 Without conducting a survey it is impossible to determine how many of these former officers would be interested in serving again. The Army would also need to make a selection of which officers they want back. However, even a small percentage of officers being reappointed in certain specialties could make a major contribution to meeting current and future reserve requirements. All other discussion aside, there is no other additional source for people, with military experience, who can be fielded rapidly to meet near to mid-term requirements at the mid-grade officer level. It is possible that officers selectively re-appointed into the USAR's IRR could go on to fill positions in the SELRES or even go back to the Active Component to finish careers.
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For junior grades, another option to increase both officer and enlisted reserve availability is raising the length of the statutory obligation from eight years to ten years. This may have the added advantage of improving longer-term retention by bringing service members to the psychological halfway point of a twenty-year career. Of course, the years of reserve service still need to meet the minimum participation requirements to count for retirement, and there may be some down sides. The example could be a four-year active duty enlistment with a Ready
Reserve service obligation of six years. A small bonus could be offered to current enlisted members who extend, but the cost should be more than offset by reduced recruitment costs. History will judge whether correct choices are made, but in the mean time, only Soldiers will bear the burden of going "to war with the Army we have". 41 Rebuilding our forces, both active and reserve, will, once again, require direction and support from the top down. Things will get worse before they get better, but hopefully the senior leadership sees the requirement to begin work now.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
When you read the works of Whitlock and Lewis, review the officer population numbers and promotion selection rates, and speak with reserve officers, the thought that the officer shortage is manageable without significant and costly effort is indefensible. The health and strength of the reserve officer corps of the United States' military and that of the Army in particular, is under stress. Nothing I have read in researching this subject argues for a smaller Army in any of its components. Lieutenant General Helmly's prediction of five to seven years to correct personnel imbalances in the USAR is probably about right if corrective action is begun soon, and if world events do not further exacerbate the current situation.
A re-balancing of force mix has been discussed and some efforts are being programmed.
In the end, I believe the long-term, cost effective answer is to add some active force structure, realign some reserve component structure, and add some reserve force structure to make a proposed five-year USAR rotation plan possible. 42 In conclusion, we must recognize and respond to the undeniable. In a system where it takes most officers four years to be commissioned; where after a year group cohort is established there is very little, if any, further input; where the officers spend several years at each pay grade over a 20 to 30 year career, if they volunteer to continue to serve; where they must graduate pre-established schools to be promoted and continue serving; and where there is a known number in each grade, specialty, and component; a shortage over time is just as predictable as the moment of sunrise. We pay skilled professionals to use mature data systems to monitor these populations, and they do. We cannot lose sight that, in the end, as General Abrams said, "The Army is people…" 43 To use a current Army phrase; it is time to start buying back risk we assumed when we allowed the strength of our reserve officer corps to diminish.
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